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Furman and Stiglitz (1998, PP. 12) stress that any credible explanation of the East
Asian crisis must account simultaneously for the crisis and for the region's precrisis
record of growth and stability. Their own explanation (pp. 13-20) roots the crisis in
government financial policies and not in the management of foreign-trade regimes,
international liquidity, or monetary and fiscal aggregates. Furman and Stiglitz blame
East Asian governments for:
1. Undertaking rapid financial and capital-account deregulation without
addressing the concomitant need to beef up their supervisory capacity; and
2. Failing to be "aware" of the systemic risk posed by the growing possibility
that the massive precrisis inflows of private capital into their countries might
fail to earn returns large enough to service the foreign debt being generated.
The explanation tendered in this paper supplies an agency-cost and contestable-
markets perspective on these so-called policy mistakes. The agency-cost part of the
argument portrays the crisis as the fruit not of blindness, but of time-inconsistent policy
gambling. It rejects the hypothesis that East Asian authorities could have truly blinded
themselves to the growing vulnerability imposed on their banking systems by booking
loans dictated by political pressure at par. Instead, the analysis substitutes the more
reasonable hypothesis that authorities had this guilty knowledge and responded to this
information myopically by gambling that deregulation would enable their insolvent banks
to grow their way out of trouble. The operative strategy had two components: helping to
cover up the losses imbedded in bank loan portfolios and enabling their banks to compete
more aggressively for domestic savings and foreign funds.
The regulatory-gambling model treats the decision to poorly supervise financial
and capital-account liberalization as a purposeful rather than inadvertent move.Regulators and politicians hoped to preserve the rents earned in the past by directing
cheap loans to politically powerful parties and sectors. These hopes were encouraged by
high precrisis rates of economic growth and by the obvious difficulty of establishing the
purposefulness of their scheme if the strategy failed.
The contestable-markets part of the story sets this gamble in the context of the
increasing globalization of financial-services competition. Year by year, offshore
innovations in financial technology and regulatory systems have been expanding
opportunities and lowering the costs for worried Asian citizens to move their wealth into
foreign institutions. Viewed from this Schumpeterian perspective, the successive
breakdown in the financial systems of the five Asian crisis countries was less a matter of
Kindleberger-Minsky "psychological contagion" than the simultaneous destruction of
longstanding government efforts to wall out foreign competition. Advances in
information and contracting technology made it easier for foreign firms to surmount
barriers to entry in distant markets at the same time that improvements in Western
regulatory systems made offshore institutions seem safer to Asian citizens than ever
before.
I. Precrisis and Postcrisis Movements of Capital
Beginning in mid-1997, five East Asian countries lapsed into severe financial
crisis: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The crises
centered both on the value of these countries' currencies and on the solvency of their
banking systems (Barth 1998; Garcia, 1998; Schwartz, 1998).
Figure One tracks the relative value in U.S. dollars of each country's currency
from April 1, 1997 to April 30, 1999. In all five crisis countries, the period of sharp
decline ended by February, 1998. The period of free fall was longest and deepest in
Indonesia, which was the only country to experience a political crisis as well. In all
countries, currency values have strengthened since early 1998. As with the fall, the
recovery has been rockiest in Indonesia, where political uncertainties remain strong. As
Mei (1999) documents, political instability makes financial stability hard to maintain.
Malaysia stabilized its currency by imposing controls on capital movements. The
other four countries negotiated a series of assistance agreements with international
2lending institutions and particular foreign countries. The sources and size of outside
assistance are summarized in Table 1. For a country undergoing crisis, the availability of
outside aid is largely conditioned on its promise to maintain convertibility, to reform
domestic financial regulation, and to strengthen its insolvent banks.
Many observers attribute the precrisis strength and sharp mid-1997 decline
observed in East Asian currency values to fluctuations in external short-term capital
movements, particularly to capital flows presumed to have been initiated by foreign
banks (e.g., Rodrik and Velasco, 1999; Mayer, 1998). Table 2 shows that U.S.,
Canadian, European, and Japanese banks increased their holdings of crisis-country debt
by $74 billion between yearend 1995 and midyear 1997 and went on to reduce their
aggregate position by $112 billion from this peak. The overall amount of this outflow
corresponds almost dollar-for-dollar with the amount of international assistance reported
for crisis countries in Table 1. Given the conditions that accompanied the outside aid, the
similarity of these two magnitudes supports the cynical hypothesis that international
crisis assistance has more to do with helping foreign banks than helping the citizens of
crisis countries.
Figure Two shows that Japanese banks (who have themselves been in continual
crisis since the early 1 990s) amassed the biggest positions and have so far beaten the
strongest retreat. The continued insolvency of maj or Japanese banks suggests that
banking policies and conditions in Japan may have contributed to the crisis by creating
incentives for Japanese bankers to book extraordinarily high-risk loans at home and
abroad (Kane, 1993). Figure Two shows that, even at yearend 1998, the exposure of
Japanese banks in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand remained high.
The expansion of foreign lending by Japanese banks in crisis countries was bound
to squeeze the profit margins of local banks. Local profit margins and economic net-
worth were further and steadily undermined by longstanding political pressure for banks
to make subsidized loans to selected economic sectors. To restore industry profit margins
to a sustainable level, insolvent institutions had to be closed or absorbed into stronger
enterprises. Table 3 summarizes the extent of insolvency-resolution activity in the four
largest crisis countries during the first nine months of the crisis. By the time exchange
rates stabilized, more than half of Thai banks and about a third of Korean and Indonesian
3banks had been resolved. In contrast, Malaysia failed to move its program for industry
restructuring beyond the planning stage.
The character of banking regulation in any given country is influenced by
bureaucratic structures (Wall and Eisenbeis, 1999) and information asymmetries that
foster incentive conflict in regulatory decisionmaking. The spread of banking insolvency
creates bad incentives not just for bankers, but also for their regulators (Kane, 1998).
Regulators come under strong political and career pressure to take actions that extend
implicit guarantees to depositors, guarantees that effectively destroy coverage limits that
may be formally imbedded in explicit deposit-insurance contracts.
Because Japanese regulators were slow to resolve banking insolvencies at home,
Japanese banks may well have initiated disruptive capital inflows into and out of the
crisis countries. However, the paper argues that the precrisis expansion of East Asian
debt at European and North American banks may more reasonably be attributed to efforts
by residents of the crisis countries to protect themselves from the unacknowledged, but
growing insolvency of their domestic banking systems.
Section II explains how sectoral political pressures create incentive conflicts that
tempt regulators to adopt policies that generate short-term macroeconomic growth and
specific sectoral subsidies at the risk of increasing the likelihood and probable depth of a
future banking crisis. Section III explains that the precrisis pattern of regulation adopted
in crisis countries was bound to lead to growing bank insolvencies and escalating silent
runs. Section IV lays out a general model of the life cycle of a regulation-induced
banking crisis. Section V expands the model to provide a role for international
competition in regulatory services and shows how regulatory competition can facilitate
the development of silent runs on an insolvent banking system. Section VI applies the
model to explain the stylized facts of the Asian case. Section VII summarizes the
argument and offers some policy advice to the IMF and World Bank.
II. Distortionary Effects of Politically Determined Patterns of Financial Regulation and
the Macroeconomy
From a macroeconomic point of view, financial activity collects and allocates
aggregate savings. The more efficiently financial institutions accomplish these twin
tasks, the higher a country's rate of investment and the more robust is the value of the
4capital stock put into place. Conversely, poor financial performance wastes savings by
supporting projects for which the subpar returns owners realize upon completion cause
the value of the capital stock to decline below its cost of production.
Erecting an array of buildings whose rents can barely begin to service their
mortgage debt represents a classic case of bank-facilitated misinvestment. The local
economy speeds up during the building stage and slackens when the rents prove
inadequate to earn profit for the owners. The ability of individual bankers to challenge
borrower projections is often in short supply in developing countries and may be nullified
by perverse incentives conveyed by inappropriate financial regulation.
This paper conceives of financial regulation as banking policy: efforts to monitor
and influence what bankers do and who bears the consequences of actual and potential
bank losses. This simplification means that the analysis applies most directly to countries
where banks finance the maj or portion of a nation's real investment. In such countries,
the unreliability of public information simultaneously restrains the expansion of domestic
bond and stock markets and taxpayers' ability to hold officials accountable for the
adverse consequences of the banking policies they follow.
From a political-economy point of view, banking regulation is a service that
produces private and social benefits and generates private and social costs. The benefits
lie in three realms: improvements in customer confidence, improvements in customer
convenience, and assistance or resistance to bank efforts to accumulate and exercise
market power. These regulatory benefits flow in different proportions to different
individuals and to different economic sectors.
Because banking regulation is costly to produce, it is possible for authorities to
produce it more or less efficiently. Even if the costs of regulation are minimized, the
burden of financing these costs must be allocated across society. The present discounted
value of the difference between the benefits a sector receives from bank regulation and
the costs that banking regulation imposes on that sector may be defined as the sector's net
regulatory benefit from banking policy, NRB.
In lobbying for favorable banking policies, we assume that individuals organize
themselves by economic interests into n sectors. Competition with other sectors consists
of capturing regulatory benefits and shifting the costs of financing these benefits to
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interestedly to push their own NRBashigh as they can, irrespective of whether the
resulting pattern of regulation may be expected to undermine regulatory efficiency or to
have unfavorable long-run macroeconomic effects.
Social controls on the job performance of government regulators responsible for
protecting the safety and soundness of financial institutions differ between developed and
developing countries. Although institutional mechanisms for promoting politically
determined loans differ between these types of countries, poor information flows and
incentive conflict in government policymaking lie at the heart of banking crises.
In developed and developing countries alike, financial regulators subject foreign
banks and the foreign operations of domestic banks to patterns of regulation that differ
importantly from those that apply to strictly domestic banking operations. The
consequences of two particular asymmetries are most relevant to the Asian Crisis. First,
most developed countries are willing to allow their domestic banks to book a wider range
of risks in foreign subsidiaries than they are prepared to tolerate in home-country offices.
This is because relationships with internationally active customers are a geographically
footloose part of the banking business and because politicians don't expect to confront
responsibility for foreign banking losses in domestic political arenas. This creates
incentives for offshore banks to "overlend" in foreign markets. Second, barriers to the
entry of foreign financial firms into local banking markets customarily exist, but in recent
years officials both in developed regions and in many developing countries have been
persuaded --by technological change and appropriate side payments-- to relax these
barriers (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizenga, 1997).
III. Banking Subsidies and Silent Runs
Banking environments and patterns of banking regulation vary greatly from
country to country. Nevertheless, three strategic elements characterize the banking
policies of almost every country in the world today:
1. Politically-Directed Subsidies to Selected Bank Borrowers: The policy
framework either requires or rewards banks for making credit available to
designated classes of borrowers at a subsidized interest rate;
62. Subsidies to Bank Risk-Taking: The policy framework commits government
officials to providing on subsidized terms either explicit or conjectural
guarantees to holders of bank liabilities;
3. Defective Monitoring and Control of the Subsidies: The contracting and
reporting framework for government officials fails to make them directly
accountable for controlling the size of either subsidy.
Taken together, the first two elements in the strategy are standard elements of
rent-seeking theory. They explain how short-horizoned authorities can allow banks to
snatch wealth surreptitiously from taxpayers and simultaneously require loan officers to
pass some or all of the wealth that is snatched to a politically designated set of favored
borrowers. The third element is a new wrinkle emphasized here. It explains what
prevents taxpayers from monitoring the joint cost of the first two strategies and from
disciplining excess transfers in timely fashion through political action or parliamentary
review. Creating an enforceable obligation for regulators to report truthfully to taxpayers
and watchdog institutions the size of the dual subsidies would make authorities
accountable for explaining whether and how taxpayer benefits generated indirectly by
these subsidies might be said to justify the costs that they pass through to taxpayers.
Without side payments from the sectors that receive net benefits, it would be
unlikely that a growing flow of subsidies could prove incentive-compatible for top
government officials even for short periods. To enlist high-ranking regulators into the
benefit-redistribution game, two further conditions must hold. First, taxpayers must be
kept from convincingly assessing by indirect means the magnitude of the costs they face
in funding the subsidies. Second, regulators themselves must be able to extract laundered
incentive compensation from banks and borrowers. Moreover, the compensation offered
must be sufficient to balance the risk of damage to the reputations of policymakers and
the regulatory bureaus they head if, during their watch on the bridge, the system for
covertly financing the subsidy were to break down.
Contradictory policy regimes may be portrayed as accidents waiting to happen. A
banking crisis occurs when a sufficient amount of bad luck hits a banking system whose
managers have made their institutions vulnerable to this amount and type of bad luck.
7Formally, the odds of experiencing a bureaucratic breakdown in a financial
system's intersectoral cost-shifting process may be modeled as an evolutionary binomial
process. We call the two states: continuation and breakdown. The probability of
breakdown, p, rises with the extent to which government guarantees (G) are not
supported by dedicated reserves. This reserve shortfall corresponds to the cumulative
size of taxpayers' hidden responsibility for making good on unfunded guarantees of bank
liabilities (T). T may also be interpreted as an index of system fragility (F). When and as
T becomes substantial, p also rises with the informativeness of the accounting principles
that are in use in a given country (A):
pp[T(F);A]. (1)
In any accounting system, the very act of making a subsidized (i.e., below-
market) loan creates an unbooked loss for banks. This overvaluation may be conceived
as "sabotaging" the reliability of the asset and net-worth values recorded on conventional
bank balance sheets. The damage from value-sabotaged lending is monitored by
financially sophisticated parties but only begins to become visible to taxpayers when and
as the amount of government-directed loans looms larger and larger on bank balance
sheets and as shortfalls emerge in the cash flows realized from the maturing investment
projects from which the subsidized bank loans must be serviced.
A bank's enterprise-contributed net worth (NWE) represents the value that the
owners could get for the bank if government deposit guarantees did not exist. Sooner or
later, savvy large-denomination depositors come to appreciate the unreported hole that
value-sabotaged loans imbed in accounting approximations to the opportunity-cost value
of their banks' NWE. As a bank's NWE declines through zero, it becomes a "zombie"
institution. A zombie is an insolvent institution whose ability to renew its deposit
funding and its foreign debt depends entirely on the continuing credibility of the explicit
and implicit government guarantees that the government's banking policies attach to its
obligations. As long as the government guarantees remain credible, its creditors have
little reason to force the zombie into a corporate grave.
Systemwide fragility F increases politically with the number of zombies (Z) and
economically with the aggregate size of their negative NWE:
8F =F[Z,NWE a)]. (2)
The more zombies there are in play, the more cohesively the industry may be
expected to lobby against insolvency resolution. The larger accumulated opportunity-
cost losses become, the larger unbooked government debt with which fiscal authorities
must contend. What we may call a "silent run" begins not when a bank becomes a
zombie, but when the accumulated implicit fiscal deficit from the government's
unbooked loss exposure in zombie banks begins to scare large-denomination depositors.
As more and more depositors and investors rationally begin to doubt whether officials
can or will continue to support its existence, the silent run on a country's banking system
gathers steam.
Doubts about a government's willingness or capacity to make taxpayers absorb
the unfunded cost of guaranteeing the country's zombie banks are a function of T. The
triggering condition is that the aggregate guarantees G soars so far above dedicated
reserves that taxpayer resistance is expected to develop. This political resistance
threatens the survivability of the incumbent government and promises to undermine its
ability to raise the funds needed to pay the bill T(F) in full. We describe runs by
sophisticated large depositors as silent because pressure on a troubled bank from
sophisticated large depositors generates far less adverse publicity than a line of panicked
small depositors does when a bank is experiencing a conventional run.
What a silent run does generate is a growing increase in each zombie bank's
funding costs. In developing countries, a zombie bank's first line of defense against a
silent run is typically to arrange loans from relatively well-informed foreign banks. Like
the sophisticated depositors that zombie bankers manage to retain, foreign banks demand
higher interest rates and increased collateralization for their claims. The net outflows of
domestic deposits that zombie banks experience are financed by a combination of
selected asset sales and high-rate new debt. In consciously deciding to finance a silent
run, foreign banks may feel confident that (as in Mexico in 1994) they can successfully
lobby the IMF, their host government, and their home governments to protect them
against defaults on their holdings of the debt of host-country banks. Foreign banks may
9also find it advantageous to speculate against the currency in offshore derivatives
markets.
Unless and until bank regulators take steps to increase the credibility of their
guarantee system (e.g., by establishing a substantial line of credit with the International
Monetary Fund), a silent run on a nation's banking system tends to escalate. This is
because zombie banks' asset sales and funding-cost increases make the fragility of the
zombies' condition visible to more and more outside observers by causing a deterioration
in the accounting values of income and net worth. When a zombie bank sells assets at
market value, its unbooked losses on subsidized loans become a larger proportion of its
footings. The more liabilities that a zombie bank rolls over at increased interest rates, the
more severely its accounting and economic profits and those of its healthier competitors
are squeezed.
A silent run increases pressure on regulators to acknowledge that zombie banks
are benefiting from deposit insurance and other less-formal government guarantees in
ways that stronger banks and general taxpayers must eventually help to pay for. As this
realization spreads, it progressively undermines the willingness of taxpayers and stronger
banks to tolerate the regulatory status quo. As a silent run unfolds, reduced profit
margins spread insolvency to previously sound banks and disturbing information is
revealed about the size of T(F). As the run proceeds, net regulatory burdens diverge
more and more drastically between zombie and nonzombie banks. The transfer of
benefits to zombies from taxpayers and viable banks becomes progressively greater the
longer a silent run proceeds. Regulatory efforts to retard the exit of inefficient and
insolvent deposit institutions lower the profit margins that strong banks can earn on
borrowed funds and push their prospective costs for funding the government's guarantee
services above the value of the guarantees that the strong institutions receive.
Our theory of the Asian Crisis may be contrasted with that of authors such as
Chang and Velasco (1998) who locate the trigger for the crisis directly in a growing
mismatch in the maturity of a country's international assets and liabilities. In our theory,
the imbalance in maturity is intensified by insolvency-driven silent runs. A surge in
short-term capital inflows is triggered by foreign lenders' increasing concern for being
able to unwind the positions they establish in economically insolvent Asian banks. The
10short-funding that troubled banks accept can be sustained only as long as their
government's guarantees remain highly credible.
Using data specific to the U.S. savings-and-loan insurance mess, Kane and Yu
(1995) show how the precrisis evolution of T can be estimated and separated from
imbalances in liquidity per se. A straightforward testable implication of our safety-net
breakdown theory is that financial crises are improbable in countries (such as Singapore
and Taiwan) whose banks are short-funded but whose banking regulators keep unbooked
taxpayer loss exposures (T) small. Tornell (1999) presents data that accord with this
presumption.
Figure Three breaks the evolution of what we may call a regulation-induced
banking crisis into six stages. The banking crises that have rolled through Japan, Korea,
the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand in recent years illustrate the first three
and one-half stages of this model. Authorities resist moving beyond stage 4A unless
several efforts at partial recapitalization have resulted in renewed crisis. In recent years,
only a few crises have passed beyond stage 4A. However, events in the U.S. and
Argentina during the 1990s illustrate some of the later stages of this life-cycle.
Rolling and incompletely resolved crises in other countries prior to 1997 taught
sophisticated Asian depositors and taxpayers at least three lessons. First, the frequency
and geographic extent of banking crises convincingly demonstrated that, around the
world, numerous banks had found it reasonable to book potentially ruinous risks.
Looking at the period 1977-1995, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) cite 58 countries in
which the net worth of the banking system was almost or entirely eliminated. Second, in
country after country, domestic (and sometimes foreign) taxpayers had been billed to bail
out banks, depositors, and deposit-insurance funds. Caprio and Klingebiel report that
taxpayers' bill for making good on implicit and explicit guarantees typically ran between
1 and 10 percent of GDP. The size of these bailouts established that bankers had often
managed to shift a substantial amount of bank risk to taxpayers. Finally, authorities
deserved substantial blame for the size of the bills taxpayers had been asked to pay.
Officials actively encouraged loss-causing patterns of credit allocation and compounded
the damage from credit losses by not resolving individual-bank insolvencies until their
situations had deteriorated disastrously. The extent of the losses indicated how
11dangerous it was to let politically corrupted risk-taking preferences of high government
officials strongly influence the flow of aggregate investment.
IV. Asset Prices and Currency Crisis
For any policymaker, a crisis may be described as a time of upheaval that
generates strong pressure for decisive changes in policy strategy. A country's currency
undergoes a crisis when foreign and domestic holders of wealth seek to reduce holdings
of assets denominated in the target currency and to sell target-currency assets short. A
currency crisis inevitably tests the solvency of a country's banks because bank deposits
typically form the main portion of liquid assets that are denominated in a country's
currency.
It is instructive to frame the evolution of economic crises as resulting in a lagged
fashion from a dialectical collision of contradictory forces:
THESIS: UNSUSTAINABLE POLICY MIX
• Expansionary Fiscal Effects of Unbooked Subsidies to Banks vs. Capacity
of Reserves to Support Relatively Fixed Exchange Rates (Krugman, 1979)
• Loss-Causing Credit-Allocation Scheme ("government-sabotaged loans")
vs. Poorly Funded Government Guarantees of Bank Liabilities (Dooley,
1997; Kane, 1998)
ANTITHESIS: MARKET DISCIPLINE TESTS GOVERNMENT PROMISES
TO SUPPORT EXCHANGE RATE AND BANKING SYSTEM
LIABILITIES
• In a Currency Crisis, the Market Test =aBear Raid
• In a Banking Crisis, the Market Test =aSilent Run or Flight to Quality
SYNTHESIS: CRISIS ARISES WHEN AUTHORITIES LOSE THEIR NERVE
AND CREATE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR WILLINGNESS TO
MAINTAIN THE CONTRADICTIONS IN MACROECONOMIC OR
BANKING POLICIES.
• Rent seeking is bound to impart to the new policy mix contradictory
elements that will conflict with market forces in new ways.
12• The probability of crisis rises the longer an unsustainable policy mix stays
in place.
The appropriate policy response to currency crisis pressures depends on the nature
of the prior contradictions in government or business policy that occasioned the crisis. A
particular issue is how extensively the observable run on the currency is compounded --or
even occasioned-- by falling prices for risky financial assets. Asset-price meltdowns are
most likely to occur when incentives for overlending by offshore zombie banks (e.g.,
those of Japan) confront a host-country policy regime that offers incentives for
overborrowing at domestic firms. In such cases, pressure on asset prices is apt to
generate a crisis-intensifying run from claims issued by insolvent domestic corporations
and commercial banks.
In the Krugman (1979) model of currency crisis, authorities accommodate explicit
domestic overspending by financing a series of unsustainable current-account deficits
which draws down the country's foreign-exchange reserves and foreign lines of credit. In
such a crisis, central-bank reserves may be rebuilt by shrinking the current-account
deficit by allowing the exchange rate to decline and by tightening fiscal and monetary
policy.
In the five Asian crisis countries, government overspending was mostly implicit
and current-account deficits proved unsustainable because they supported a malinvested
transfer of foreign private capital. As long as foreign-initiated capital inflows persisted,
the current account had to accommodate the transfer of enough real resources to absorb
them. Table 2 shows that a good portion of the precrisis capital inflow took the form of
lending by risk-hungry zombie banks from Japan.
In the five crisis countries, besides supporting domestic investment, capital
inflows in 1994-1996 financed any depositors who wanted to flee zombie banks and
permitted foreign-exchange reserves to increase by over $35billion(Institute of
International Finance, 1998). Recipient countries ran current-account deficits to absorb
these capital inflows and suffered a substantial decline in investment spending when the
inflows stopped. Using even the crudest model of aggregate demand, this interruption in
resources looking to finance domestic investment projects implied a sizable recession.
During this recession, capital and labor had to move out of inefficient activities
13(including many of the projects previously subsidized by politically driven schemes for
allocating credit) and into efficient ones. The resulting asset revaluations revealed and
accentuated hidden losses and deepened the insolvencies of the region's zombie
institutions.
It is painful to resolve corporate and banking insolvencies in the midst of a
recession. In crisis circumstances, politicians are strongly tempted to reflate demand and
either impose strict capital controls (as in Malaysia) or to direct foreign bailout funds to
strengthening the resources of the government's system for guaranteeing zombie lending
institutions, without doing much to resolve the continuing incentive distortions that
undermined banking-system insolvency in the first place. Nevertheless, the gambles
made by Japanese authorities support the hypothesis that leaving bank and corporate
insolvencies unresolved fosters incentives for further malinvestment and enhances the
likelihood that an even deeper crisis will emerge down the line.
The policy mistakes that reversed the 1994-1996 capital inflows were made in the
financial, corporate, and government-planning sectors that allowed rent seekers to
determine how most of the resources transferred from abroad would be used in each
country. It is because these capital inflows were not invested at a satisfactory real rate of
return that asset values and bank net worth now have to be written down in recipient
countries. Had increasing government loss exposures been financed by taxes and private
real asset values either been sustained by an appropriate expansion in productive capacity
or written down promptly as unfavorable information surfaced, large-denomination
depositors and other prior investors in recipient-country assets would have had no reason
to run recipient-country currencies.
V. The Two-Stage Globalization of Regulatory Competition'
Contemporary theories of industrial organization seek to explain how a product's
market structure evolves through time to permit efficient firms to discipline or displace
relatively less-efficient competitors. The force of these theories is particularly easy to
grasp when we focus on hypothetical markets that meet a set of ideal conditions that
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1986) call "perfect contestability."
1Thissection draws heavily on Kane (1991).
14A market is perfectly contestable when entry and exit costs are each zero and
incumbent firms exit quickly whenever they find themselves faced with negative profits.
In perfectly contestable markets, low-cost firms readily displace high-cost firms and
incumbent competitors are prevented from setting monopoly prices by the threat of hit-
and-run entry by other equally-efficient firms.
This paper deploys an imperfectly contestable-markets perspective on market-
structure change to discern two stages of financial deregulation in Asia and elsewhere.
The first stage takes the form of de facto deregulation of entry barriers by market forces.
The second stage consist of subsequent de jure ratification and regularization of market
developments by the financial regulatory establishment.
During the last 30 years, technological change has made banking and other formal
and informal financial markets increasingly more contestable. This brought clients that
were regulated by regulators from other countries and from other domestic jurisdictions
into increasing competition with one another. The second stage of deregulation followed
when and as this mutual invasion of traditional markets put increasing pressure on
specialized incumbent regulators to re-examine the burdensomeness of their rules.
First Stage: Dc Facto Market Deregulation
For several decades and particularly in corporate banking markets around the
world, technological change steadily lowered entry costs for foreign and non-traditional
competitors. Initially, the more-cautious foreign and nontraditional financial firms
booked their market-share incursions in innovative ways. They did banking business by
making creative use of substitute products, substitute organizational forms, and substitute
offshore locations. In most countries, a new entrant's ability to use differently regulated
substitute opportunities was facilitated by longstanding and burdensome restrictions on
how traditional deposit institutions could compete domestically.
Second Stage: De Jure Ratification and Reregularization of Market-Driven
Deregulation
The second stage occurred when regulators officially acquiesced in this
innovative entry by foreign and non-traditional firms and went on to relax many of the
restraints under which their traditional clients had previously operated. As banks'
aggregate market share shrank, they pressed politically for their traditional domestic
regulators to relax or jettison their most burdensome regulations. At the same time,
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to offer them charters that could regularize and reduce the circumvention costs
occasioned by their creative de facto incursion into that country's banking markets. In
Asia and elsewhere, authorities' positive response to these politicalpressures during the
1980s and 1990s has been labeled financial deregulation.
Around the world, governmental and market deregulation has been greater for
wholesale and private banking markets than for retail ones. Moreover, the word
deregulation is in any case a misnomer for the detailed pattern of second-stage or
"regularizing" regulatory adjustments that followed. In many countries a deregulation of
entry costs was combined with lags in imposing adequate prudential supervision that
amounted to a far-from-deregulatory accentuation of regulatory barriers to exit for
insolvent domestic deposit-institution competitors. Using the contestable-markets
paradigm of market-structure change makes it clear that banking deregulation in most
countries initially occurred only on the entry side and that subsequent regulatory efforts
to resist the exit of at least some classes of traditional domestic competitors foreshortened
some of the increased contestability in specific banking markets that entry relaxation
would otherwise have produced. Banking regulators have lowered regulatory entry costs
almost to zero, but in adopting or strengthening domestic guarantee systems,many
countries turned around and raised incumbent exit barriers thereafter.
It is important to understand that incumbent banks' ability and willingness to run
negative profits are a form of exit costs. Exit costs limit a new entrant's ability to
penetrate a market. By resisting the exit of its unprofitable clients, a regulator can
prevent efficient competitors from being able to earn enough profits to sustain permanent
entry. As foreign and nontraditional financial-services competitors have come to
appreciate the importance of regulator-financed exit costs in many countries, they have
slowed their rate of entry into new banking markets and even reversed some of their past
entry.
VI. How Regulatory Competition Influenced the Asian Banking Crises
What Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and the press describe as a "banking crisis"may be
more accurately characterized as the surfacing of tensions caused by the continuing
16efforts of zombie banks to force the rest of society to accept responsibility for the
zombies' unpaid bills for making bad loans. In the five Asian countries, longstanding
systems for subsidizing inefficient loans to favored individuals imposed unhooked losses
on their banking systems. These situations lasted for years. They turned into banking
and currency crises only when doubts began to surface about authorities' willingness and
ability to bond the growing liabilities of an economically insolvent banking system. As
in the U.S. savings-and-loan mess, crisis pressures were triggered in the face of silent
runs by regulatory second thoughts about the wisdom of asking taxpayers to pay the full
value of conjectural government guarantees.
Around the world, financial institutions and markets and concomitant regulatory
systems show numerous country-specific features (Wilson, 1986; Germides etal., 1991).
Differences in patterns of financial regulation parallel differences that exist in the
particular economic, political, and bureaucratic deficiencies and inefficiencies that
regulation is overtly or covertly expected to correct (Kane, 1999).
However, the survival of differences in regulatory patterns is limited by the
tendency of private capital and loan-making opportunities to flow to markets and
institutions that offer their customers the best deals. The extent to which net regulatory
burdens on financial markets and institutions differ across countries is narrowed by the
regulatory arbitrage this deal-flow entails. When and as technological change in
information processing and telecommunications lowers the cost of transacting with
foreign entities, adverse flows of capital and financial deals should help to persuade a
nation's authorities to lower the net burdens that their regulatory framework imposes on
the savers, investors, and financial intermediaries that transact in its financial markets.
In recent years, the increased frequency of banking and currency crises traces to
two events. First, advances in information and communications technology have
globalized banking markets and the market for government guarantees. Second,
globalization of markets for banking and guarantee services has made it less costly for
domestic corporations and wealthy investors to mount silent runs on a country's zombie
banks.
When banking markets are globalized, services that provide regulatory benefits to
bank customers are available from foreign as well as domestic suppliers. The greater is
17customer access to foreign suppliers, the more easily the struggle for net regulatory
benefits in one country can spill outside its national boundaries to involve foreign banks
and their home-country suppliers of financial regulation.
The market for regulatory services may be defined as a body of persons that carry
on extensive transactions in the specific activity of promulgating, enforcing, and
accepting regulatory restrictions. Demand-side adjustments exist in this market because
the jurisdictions of individual suppliers are fixed only in the very short run. As a
regulatee' s horizon lengthens, the voluntariness of its relationships with regulators rises
steadily. Switching becomes optimal over any horizon for which the increase in a
regulatee' s NRBislarge enough to overcome the transactions cost of transferring all or
part of its regulatory business to a more favorable supplier. Geographic overlaps in the
global market for financial regulatory services have expanded as the costs of entering and
exiting banking markets have declined around the world. Ongoing downward trends in
these entry and exit costs render the margin of regulatory competition --even in
developing countries-- increasingly global.
Because regulation is supplied competitively and accepted voluntarily, rules and
enforcement systems are continually tested and reshaped by market discipline.
Nevertheless, switching costs make the contestability of regulatory markets inherently
imperfect. An individual regulatory entity has market power to the extent it can lower the
net benefits its operations offer without immediately surrendering its entire market share.
Because the market discipline to which labor, capital, and political markets subject
individual regulatory officials (including elected politicians) is less than complete, this
market power can be used to develop personal and bureaucratic benefits.
The perfectibility of regulatory competition is limited by information asymmetries
and other sources of principal-agent conflict inherent in governmental processes.
Taxpayers' social contract with governmental entities invests top officials with quasi-
monopolistic coercive powers. Although taxpayers want government officials to exercise
these powers to promote the "common good," officials may convincingly misrepresent
the effects and purposes of their policies. It is not easy for citizens to ascertain the true
motives of policymakers or to document side payments that officials choose to conceal.
18Even when events turn up evidence that favors were received, it is difficult toprove
intent and the political system tends to defend the policies in question.
Regulatory competition provides an economic check on the fairness and
efficiency of sectoral NRBs. On the demand side, competition encourages parties that
feel overburdened by their government's system of regulation to remedy matters by
incurring the switching costs necessary to move their business to the jurisdiction of a
cheaper supplier of regulatory services. The new supplier may be a private organization,
but is more often a foreign government. Technological trends that lower the switching
costs of changing one's regulatory supplier make the demand-side check ever more
complete.
On the supply side, the costs to a supplier of entering and exiting a new financial
market are substantial. The existence of these costs means that the number of potential
new entrants that can economically supply regulatory services to banks in any country is
limited in the short run. For private regulators, entry into new markets is limited by the
costs of building up sufficient public standing and coercive authority to be perceived as a
reliable supplier of regulatory services. Would-be entrants need demonstrable skills and
reputational capital. Successful entry into any regulatory market requires both a capacity
for raising and distributing funds and a capacity for exercising disciplinarypower. An
entrant must be able to enforce a system of rewards and punishments sufficient to change
the behavior of potential regulatees. Every entrant must be able to promise credibly that
it can fairly and truly regulate and is committed to doing this for a long while.
Exploitive regulation drives sophisticated depositors, borrowers, and other bank
stakeholders to book at least some of their business elsewhere: either abroad or in
informal and differently regulated domestic markets. These acts of regulatory arbitrage
limit the extent to which markets will tolerate a vector of regulatory burdens that deviates
from its optimal long-run path composition. Authorities in countries such as Singapore
and Taiwan that aspire to become international financial centers --and indeed inany
country whose political environment supports a reasonably long decisionmaking
horizon—appear to have grasped this long ago.
The 1997-1998 crises in Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand were hastened by the continuing technologically drivenpassage in these
19countries to a more-globalized market structure in which large depositors could shop for
ways to protect themselves against the burdens of unsustainably costly patterns of
financial regulation. Globalization put the costs and benefits of host-country banking
regulation into closer competition with the Basle-enhanced regulatory systems of
offshore financial centers.
Offshore banking competition shortened the crisis-gestation period in twoways.
First, even limited entry by outside banks expanded the stock of well-priced domestically
available substitutes for deposits that local citizens had previously held in host-country
banks. This lowered the cost to Asian depositors of participating in a silent run on local
banks. Second, the greater safety of foreign-bank deposit substitutes reflects thegreater
economic efficiency of the (albeit still-imperfect) performance guarantees written for
each offshore entrant by the regulatory systems of its homeland.
Each new crisis constitutes an exit cost that society pays to shrink the domain of a
high-cost or inequitable regulator. Crises are triggered by efforts to avoid the
inefficiencies and inequities that political maneuvering tends to produce when a
government enjoys monopoly power in its domestic "onshore" market for regulatory
services. By squeezing the equilibrium rents that short-sighted or corruptible officials
can extract in individual countries, offshore regulatory competition has the salutary effect
of creating pressure to discipline inefficient regulators and perhaps even to improve
public-service contracting in the longer run.
In a perfect world, the normative goal of financial reform would be to induce fair
and efficient patterns of regulation and supervision. Regulators should be made
accountable not just for producing a stable financial economy, but for providing this
stability fairly and at minimum cost to society. In practice, this means establishing
incentives that lead authorities to adopt market-mimicking standards of regulatory
performance. In the absence of explicit or implicit government guarantees, markets
would insist that any bank that experiences opportunity-cost losses do one or more of
three things: shrink, raise more capital, or pay higher interest rates for funds. The public-
policy problem is to find efficient ways to make it in regulators' self-interest to invoke
"market-mimicking" disciplines when and as a country's important institutions weaken.
20VII. Summary and Policy Implications
This paper seeks to establish a cohesive microeconomic perspective on the
financial crises experienced in Asia during 1997-98. The model offered emphasizes how
distortions created by faulty banking regulation affect capital allocation, asset prices, and
bank solvency. The analysis combines four ideas:
1. Regulatory distortions create ex-ante incentives for capital misallocation.
Government guarantees cause banks to allocate capital to unsustainably risky
projects that could be financed only at much higher interest rates if
government guarantees did not exist. Politically directed credit subsidies put
too much capital into favored sectors and too little capital elsewhere.
2. When politically directed loans are made at below-market interest rates, an
unbooked opportunity loss is incurred by the lending bank. Government
deposit guarantees cannot credibly cover continued growth in these unbooked
losses indefinitely without incident. From time to time, a government's
ability and willingness to bail out its insolvent banks is bound to be tested by
silent runs. A crisis occurs when the accumulated size of banks' opportunity
losses becomes both too big to hide and too big to cover over with budget
gimmickry.
3. The entry of foreign and better-regulated banks into the domestic market tends
to accelerate the demise of insolvent domestic banks. Savers silently shift
funds towards foreign banks. Foreign banks, free of credit-allocation
pressure, pick off the best customer relationships and new investment projects
in the economy.
4. Domestic asset prices fall as the true value of the capital stock is revealed.
The decline is reinforced macroeconomically as investment is curtailed and
the formerly subsidized domestic firms are denied access to new credit. The
losses filter through domestic-bank balance sheets, forcing the banks to realize
market-value losses and households to reduce their spending.
Our analysis treats runs on the currencies of crisis countries as insolvency-
revealing runs on their banks. Although IMF officials were quick to assist in stabilizing
troubled currencies, they found it much harder to address the banking side of each crisis.
21The contradictions in regulatory policies that made banks insolvent were too well
supported politically to be corrected swiftly.
IMF officials understand that strengthening bank supervision is a critical part of
crisis resolution. But the IMF's own political vulnerability supports a reluctance to
publicize the particular incentive structures that made a crisis country's supervision weak
in the first place. In a crisis atmosphere, it is apt to seem politically destablizing for the
IMF to stress the need for public-service contracting reforms and information-disclosure
regimes for banks and regulators that would be strong enough to make tougher
supervision in an incentive-conflicted regulator's self-interest.
Still, for any country, the size of sustainable deviations from a fair and efficient
distribution of net regulatory burdens falls with declines in the opportunity costs its
citizens face in engaging in capital flight. In turn, the net benefit to individuals of
engaging in capital flight increases with advances in information technology, with the
volatility of the real economy, and with the fluidity of the political environment.
Recognizing this creates incentives for the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund to improve the quality Of their policy advice in the future. Allan Meltzer (e.g.,
1998) has long emphasized that, to avoid subsidizing insolvent banks, IMF loans to crisis
countries should be made only to demonstrably solvent banks on good collateral and only
at a penalty rate. International institutions might also undertake research to clarify for
authorities in developing countries that the global information revolution has unleashed
market forces that make it short-sighted to adopt credit-allocation schemes that are bound
to decapitalize their banks and increasingly difficult to ask their taxpayers to subsidize
weak banks and uneconomic enterprises. Finally, international institutions could
reinforce this advice by fostering the development of information-revealing private
markets in credit derivatives whose payoffs would be conditioned on the occurrence of
observable default events in various developing countries.
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Assistance Offered Crisis Countries by the International Community
(in billions of U.S. $)
IMF
Disbursements
As of 6/9/99 IMF Multilateraf Bilateral Total
Indonesia 11.2 10.0 21.1 42.3 9.5
Korea 21.1 14.2 23.1 58.4 19.4
Philippinest l.6 0 0 l.6 1.6
Thailand 4.0 2.7 10.5 17.2 3.2
Total 37.9 26.9 54.7 119.5 33.7
Notes:
*
WorldBank and Asian Development Bank.
As of yearend 1998.
Source: These data were graciously provided by Gillian Garcia of the IMF. They update a table published in Garcia (1998), p. 27.
Country CommitmentsTable 2
International Claims of BIS Reporting Banks on Countries outside
the Reporting Area (in millions U.S. $)
End-December1995 Claims by Banks in Country:







Indonesia 21,297 2,778 3,893 2,727 8,758 5,390 44,843
South Korea 21,309 7,590 7,318 3,861 13,29124,023 77,392
Malaysia 7,289 1,523 2,249 1,158 2,918 1,622 16,759
Philippines 987 2,946 711 631 2,413 637 8,325
Thailand 37,056 4,097 4,977 2,822 7,886 6,156 62,994
TOTAL 87,93818,93419,14811,199 35,26637,828 210,313
End-June 1996 Claims by Banks in Country:
Japan U.S.GermanyUKOther EuropeAll GRAND
and CanadaOther* TOTAL
Claims on:
Indonesia 21,947 3,551 4,843 3,260 10,385 5,645 49,306
South Korea 22,368 9,582 8,529 4,140 15,05928,205 88,027
Malaysia 8,102 1,896 3,195 1,218 3,536 2,124 20,100
Philippines 1,397 3,351 1,475 782 2,864 921 10,795
Thailand 37,777 4,433 6,381 3,070 9,664 8,309 69,409
TOTAL 91,59122,81324,42312,470 41,50845,204 237,637
End-December 1996 Claims by Banks in Country:
Japan U.S.GermanyUKOther EuropeAll GRAND
and CanadaOther* TOTAL
Claims on:
Indonesia 22,035 5,279 5,508 3,834 12,258 6,609 55,523
SouthKorea 24,324 9,355 9,977 5,643 19,55431,100 99,953
Malaysia 8,210 2,337 3,857 1,417 4,067 2,346 22,234
Philippines 1,558 3,902 1,820 1,173 3,751 1,085 13,289
Thailand 37,525 5,049 6,914 3,128 10,210 7,321 70,147








Indonesia 23,153 4,591 5,610 4,332 13,377 7,663 58,726
South Korea 23,732 9,96410,794 6,064 20,78132,097 103,432
Malaysia 10,489 2,400 5,716 2,011 5,211 2,993 28,820
Philippines 2,109 2,816 1,991 1,076 4,230 1,893 14,115
Thailand 37,749 4,008 7,557 2,818 10,442 6,808 69,382
TOTAL 97,23223,77931,66816,301 54,04151,454 274,475
End-December 1997 Claims by Banks in Country:







Indonesia 22,018 4,898 6,174 4,492 13,520 7,286 58,388
South Korea 20,278 9,533 9,616 6,924 18,88328,946 94,180
Malaysia 8,551 1,786 7,197 2,014 5,061 2,919 27,528
Philippines 2,624 3,224 2,999 1,607 6,240 3,038 19,732
Thailand 33,180 2,533 6,028 2,361 9,554 5,179 58,835
TOTAL 86,65121,97432,01417,398 53,25847,368 258,663
End-June 1998 Claims by Banks in Country:
Japan U.S.GermanyUKOther EuropeAll GRAND
and CanadaOther* TOTAL
Claims on:
Indonesia 19,030 3,226 5,876 3,967 12,773 5,396 50,268
South Korea 18,934 7,409 8,400 5,634 15,68716,380 72,444
Malaysia 7,905 1,149 5,160 1,613 4,394 2,803 23,024
Philippines 2,308 3,025 2,161 1,775 7,152 1,382 17,803
Thailand 26,120 1,757 5,286 2,088 8,567 2,983 46,801
TOTAL 74,29716,56626,88315,077 48,57328,944 210,340
28'4
End-December1998 Claims by Banks in Country:
Japan U.S.GermanyUKOther EuropeAll GRAND
and CanadaOther* TOTAL
Claims on:
Indonesia 16,402 3,537 5,638 3,814 10,567 4,869 44,827
South Korea 16,925 6,291 8,250 5,551 13,90514,371 65,293
Malaysia 6,623 858 4,618 2,040 4,370 2,317 20,826
Philippines 2,324 2,657 2,304 1,844 5,452 1,579 16,160
Thailand 22,437 1,358 4,687 1,775 8,150 2,342 40,749
TOTAL 64,711 14,70125,49715,024 42,44425,478 187,855
Source: "The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending," Bank for
International Settlements, various years.
*"AllOther" Claims include claims of affiliates and branches of banks which have their head-
offices outside of the BIS reporting area and "residual" claims.
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Ireland have no exposure to the selected Asian countries.
29Table 3
Number of Bank Insolvencies Resolved or Scheduled to be Resolved in the Four Largest Asian
Crisis Countries During the First Nine Months of the East Asian Crisis
Nationalized!
July, 1997 Number Administered by Foreign-Bought
of Banks and ClosedlSuspended Restructuring Planning to Merge (majority stake)
Finance Companies Agency
Thaliand 108 56 4 0 4
Malaysia 60 0 0 41 0
Indonesia 228 16 56 11 0
South Korea 56 16 2 0 0
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32Figure Three
Six Stages of a Regulation-Induced Banking Crisis
1. Generation of Multiple Zombies
• Transition Via Government-Directed Lending and Subsidies to
Risk Taking
• Transition to Zombieness is Apt to Be Particularly Rapid at State-
Owned Banks
2. Escalating Silent Runs Driven by Size of Unbooked Losses Test
Strength of Government Commitment to Support Zombies
• Regulatory Reliance on Disinformation and Coverup
• Difficulty for Banks of Weathering Runs Rises Over Time
3. Palpable Bureaucratic Breakdown in Government's Guarantee
Support Mechanisms
4. Recapitalization of Government Stabilization Funds
A. Stopgap Partial Recapitalization: Back to Stage 2
B. Full Taxpayer Bailout or Explicit Nationalization
5.Clean-Upof Zombie Institutions
6. Blame Distribution and Substantial Change in the Banking-Policy
Regime